Tag Archives: democracy

Excerpt: excuses and criticisms for electing inferiors

Sometimes I accidentally write political science, in the context of trying to write more compelling literature. I say that only half-flippantly. Experience tires of what it knows too familiarly, you see. Besides, politics skips over many things I consider essential preliminaries, in order to arrive at loud, thoughtless disagreement that much more efficiently.

NB: Not written about current events specifically, but germane, and therefore I am posting it. I do not write about current events, per se. Current events tend to come back to the same things, again and again. I do write about those things.

Without further ado, an excerpt from work in progress:

When it became fairly apparent (to others) that in time, manifest inferiors would rule democratic republics instead of the best men (in any usual sense, moral or able)—as so often happens in present day, in the calculus of voting machines, mass media, party and political machines—they made excuses. Rationalizations, critiques, and theories proliferated, and they have ever since. Most have blamed technicalities of constitutional procedure, or electoral process, for these “wrong” results. Many have blamed an uneducated citizenry. Partisans blame opponents.

All these critiques come from ideological agreement, from those convinced of the rightness of democracy, or at least taking it for granted (a tenet without alternative), often from insiders in the political class.

They would never conclude, for instance, that corrupt bargains for influence promoting oligarchs and plutocrats among the political class describes an equilibrium of theoretical popular governance, no matter its design.

Insiders in particular would never interpret lack of intellectual competence among bureaucrats and politicians of the state as [suitable] avoidance of misspent, frustrated careers by competent people who have other ambitions and serve other masters. And the more enormous the bureaucracy, the more immune its unelected mediocrity to change by election of very few supervising officials, and their direct appointees.

An unusual critique from outside the consensus lamented a perversion of the natural order by the weakening effect of misguided egalitarian doctrines, from democratic, Judeo-Christian, and socialist origins, promoted with the effect, if not also the intention, that diminutive, weak men could overcome their superiors. Men had become sheeplike, or overly tamed.

This critique happened to agree with neo-aristocrats, oligarchs, and republicans alike that the many, especially the uneducated mob, were not to be trusted with the reins of government. Inferior men could climb up on their backs, to loud applause. Voting was a godsend to the ambitious political creatures whose talents lay in demagoguery, empty promises, fear-mongering, and other unscrupulous means.

But to the traditional mistrust of demagogues, this critique added the [interesting] charge that the potential quality of men had been corrupted, not only by lacking education but also by excess of rote, mass education in uniformity, agreement, and passivity—in the name of equality and good citizens, instead of serving the more venerable, selective educational goal of cultivating a remarkable elite.

Other outsiders critiqued democratic principle not for its foundation upon the many, but for sanctioning and legalizing the might of the many—called mob rule in its informal guise—as though numbers excused or ennobled the exercise of power, and in this case alone, might makes right.

They saw no reason for surprise whenever democratic republics failed. For democratic institutions remained systems for assigning compulsory powers, not fundamentally unlike any ancient state for having devised representation, imagined “good government,” and forgotten the origins of governance in oppression by conquerors, caste, or class.

They summarized that history has always reflected a generally conflicted (if not inverse) relationship between attracting the best men and offering them power. Power to enforce one’s will instead, unsurprisingly, attracts those who cannot exercise any consistent restraint, or corrupts those who have power, including those born into it. Exercise of power for aggrandizement is rarely tempered, with difficulty, only temporarily, and somewhat against the natural tendency.

In fact the founders of modern constitutional republics were not unaware of this critique. Among them, skeptics of democracy as a positive good admitted they could not answer it, and feared it would prove correct. They were not naive enough to believe that men who acquired might would somehow cease to crown themselves right. They hoped that individual rights could find protection for a time, despite tyrants, oligarchs, mobs and demagogues.

Now, the context for generating this digression was: writing about right and might (the famous debate in Thucydides over the fate of the poor island of Melos crops up) as an unusual, applied way of writing about a distinction between the “neutral” descriptive function of idealized science, and the prescriptive, normative, or persuasive functions of value-driven fields such as ethics, or applied science (medicine, psychiatry, engineering), arts, or religion. In a nutshell, saying what happens is importantly, quite different from saying what should happen.

Talking about how those two purposes can either corrupt, or assist each other, is very important to the philosophy of science, to argumentation, to psychology, and to pretty much any subject that people have positions about, or try to understand. Half of political discourse is really about trying to blur the two. (The Athenians certainly do in Thucydides.)

So actually, this is a representative selection in a sense, not for its specific subject material, but because it came about from the larger goal of teaching and reconsidering fundamentals through novel illustrations. In this case, philosophy of science through the lens of political science, in particular, all the thinking surrounding right and might, might makes right, etc. I went off on the tangent above (it happens), broke off that piece, and here you are.

Trump: Fascist in style, as well as substance

Dave Weigel reports:

“Sal Russo, the longtime Republican strategist who co-founded the Tea Party Express PAC in 2009, came to Nevada to back Cruz. He used some downtime to attend Trump’s Monday night rally on the Strip, which packed nearly 10,000 people into an arena, eight times more than had ever attended a Cruz rally in the state. “I’ve been to a lot of rallies,” said Russo. “I’ve never seen anything like this one. He would say something — ‘punch that guy in the face!’ — and the veins would be popping out of people’s necks.”

Victory for Trump in Nevada: one more step (three in a row now) to electing a fascist in style, as well as substance.

(The substance of fascism has already been building up to some kind of crescendo, if you’re knowledgable about fascism in policy—ratcheting since the era of Mussolini and FDR actually, not just since 9-11. I would argue that the style of fascism has been building since 9-11, too.)

Trump continues to lead dramatically in polls, and shows the ability to draw voters from every standard polling demographic. Unless something strange occurs, he will be the nominee at this rate. So a celebrity billionaire may be the exception that proves the rule, that an outsider with grassroots support usually cannot break through firewalls of party rules, cheats, and intended hurdles set up by the establishment to crush alternatives they view as insurgencies, like the candidacy of Jeffersonian Ron Paul.

If Trump continues to be able to attract throngs at this rate, in fact, he can become President, by motivating angry people to vote who hadn’t necessarily before. And then of course, he will wield the great and terrible discretionary powers that have been assembled over many years by politicians who fancied themselves in charge, and not a loudmouth real estate mogul populist. Obama’s executive order precedents, for example, will be a way for Trump to get around Congress.

It does not help that his likely establishment opponent in the other party is a thuggish operator, a conniving but incompetent criminal, a warmonger bought off by warmongers, and thoroughly corrupt—the first female gangster in the White House, if you will. Hillary Clinton is unpopular with many civilized people outside the usual party-machine voting blocks, and unlikely to motivate great numbers in her own right.

Proponents of democracy as a positive good in itself are going to have trouble accepting this, but the mob (most voters) love a strongman, as long as they think he is “theirs.” They always have. That’s where successful dictators come from; not from some unpopular military junta, but from genuine popularity, like Caesar or Napoleon or Hitler. The usual historical outcome of democratic institutions within a powerful (centralized) state is that “the people” entrust their futures to a strongman who suggests he will overturn the elites they hate.

My fellow dissidents in America, it’s time to follow the wise example of Robert Higgs and give serious, pragmatic thought to an exit strategy. (Dr. Higgs, among the greatest living intellectual critics of the state and an expert on American authoritarianism, has already moved to Mexico.)